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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
L.R.S.C. Co. ("LRSC") appeals an order of the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware that 
authorized the assignment of its lease with debtor Rickel 
Home Centers, Inc. to Staples, Inc., both of which are 
appellees, and that struck from that lease a provision 
limiting the tenant's use of the premises to a "Channel 
Home Center." The principal issue on appeal is whether 
LRSC's failure to obtain a stay of the order has rendered its 
appeal moot. If not, we must consider LRSC's various 
challenges on their merits. 
 





LRSC is the landlord of a shopping center in Lawrence 
Township, New Jersey (the "Lawrence center"). The 
 
Lawrence center contains a variety of tenants including, 
inter alia, stores that sell furniture, music and electronics 
items, clothing, shoes, and auto parts, as well as 
restaurants and banks. The center also contains three 
anchor stores. One is a Burlington Coat Factory. Another is 
an Acme supermarket. The third was formerly operated by 
Rickel, the debtor, as a home improvement store. Rickel is 
the successor in interest to Channel Companies, Inc. 
(Channel), which had a lease from LRSC for premises 
covering approximately 38,000 square feet of retail space 
("the Lease"). The Lawrence center premises had been used 
as a home improvement store since 1976 in accordance 
with a use provision contained in Article 10 of the Lease, 
which provides: 
 
       Use 
 
        ART. 10. Tenant may use the Premises as a Channel 
       Home Center similar in operation to a majority of the 
       Channel Home Centers then in operation in New 
       Jersey, and except as provided herein, for no other 
       purpose. . . . Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
       contained in this Article 10, provided Tenant has 
       complied with the provisions of Article 15B hereof 
       [which effectively requires the landlord's consent], any 
       non-"Successor" or non-"Affiliate" (as defined in Article 
       15A) assignee or sublessee of Tenant may use and 
       operate the Premises for any lawful retail purpose, 
       subject to the restrictions contained in Article 15B 
       hereof. 
 
Addendum to Appellant's Br. at 1. 
 
Article 10 references Article 15 of the Lease, which 
provides, inter alia, (1) that the tenant may assign or 
sublease any portion of the premises to a successor entity 
-- one resulting from the consolidation, merger, or transfer 
of substantially all of the tenant's assets -- without 
providing notice to or obtaining the consent of LRSC, and 
(2) that LRSC may terminate the Lease upon an assignment 
or sublease of more than 80 percent of the premises by the 
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tenant to any non-successor entity:1 The original term of 
the Lease was for fifteen years with three five-year options 
to renew. One option was exercised by Channel on January 
29, 1991. Its successor Rickel sought to renew for another 
five years on January 29, 1996 although the Lease was 
apparently in default at that time. However, on January 10, 
1996 Rickel had filed a voluntary petition for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. It remained in 




1. The relevant language is as follows: 
 
        "Assigning, Mortgaging, Subletting 
 
        ART. 15A. Tenant shall have the right, without Landlords [sic] 
       consent and without any requirement to notify Landlord as provided 
       in B below, to (A) assign its interest as tenant under this Lease 
or 
 
       sublet any portion of the Demised Premises at any time or times to 
       (i) a successor person, firm or corporation resulting from 
       consolidation, merger or from transfer of substantially all of 
Tenant's 
       assets, (herein referred to as "Successor") . . . . 
 
       B.1. Tenant may assign this Lease, or sublet or underlet part or 
       or [sic] all of the Demised Premises. 
 
        2. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Tenant shall notify Landlord 
       at least thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of any 
       assignment [or subletting of more than 80 percent of the 
       premises] of this Lease to any non-Affiliate or non-Successor 
       . . . . Landlord shall then have the option of terminating this 
       Lease . . . . 
 
        3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1 above, 
       Tenant shall notify Landlord . . . of any subletting to any 
       non-Affiliate or non-Successor of less than eighty (80%) 
       percent of the Demised Premises . . . . Landlord shall then 
       have the option of taking back the portion(s) of the Premises 
       proposed to be sublet . . . . 
 
        4. Any assignment . . . pursuant to the provisions of 
       subsections B1, 2 or 3 above, shall prohibit the use of the 
       Premises by such assignee or sublessee for any use which 
       is on the date of execution of this Lease or at the time of 
       such assignment or sublease the principal use of any tenant 
       located in the Shopping Center. . . . 
 
Addendum to Appellant's Br. at 2-4. 
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On December 10, 1996, LRSC filed a motion in the 
Bankruptcy Court seeking an order (1) compelling Rickel to 
assume or reject the Lease prior to the March 6, 1997 
deadline established by the court for the assumption or 
rejection of non-residential real property leases and (2) 
declaring void Rickel's prior exercise of its option to renew 
the Lease for another term. The parties subsequently 
entered into a stipulation in which Rickel agreed tofile a 
motion to assume or reject the Lease on or before February 
18, 1997 and LRSC agreed that Rickel had effectively 
exercised its option to extend the Lease until January 31, 
2002. Rickel did move to assume the Lease on February 18, 
1997. The Bankruptcy Court granted that motion and 
directed Rickel to pay almost $18,000 to cure its default. 
 
After settling the dispute with LRSC, Rickel continued to 
operate as debtor-in-possession and attempted to 
reorganize its operations. It subsequently concluded that it 
would be unable successfully to reorganize and determined 
to wind up its operations and liquidate its retail store 
inventories and remaining assets. On October 24, 1997, the 
Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Rickel's 
motion to liquidate its inventory and sell its furniture, 
fixtures, equipment, and other personal property (FF&E). 
The inventory was subsequently sold in a bulk sale. 
Thereafter, the leases to which Rickel was a party were its 
most substantial remaining assets. 
 
Rickel hired a broker to market the leases and received 
numerous offers. Among them was one from Staples to 
purchase a package of forty-one leases, including the 
Lawrence center Lease, for $35.5 million. The offer allowed 
the purchaser to assign its rights to any nominee, although 
Rickel and Staples anticipated that any such nominee 
would be a Staples affiliate and would operate a Staples 
office superstore on the premises. Staples planned to 
occupy 24,000 of the 38,000 square feet of the Lawrence 
center premises as a Staples store and to sublet the 
balance. 
 
On February 12, 1998, Rickel sought court approval for 
its proposed transaction with Staples. Specifically, Rickel 
moved for an order authorizing it "to sell 41 of its leases 
[including the Lawrence Lease] to Staples (or its nominee) 
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. . . ."2 Rickel also sought to invalidate various provisions 
contained in some or all of the leases, including terms 
"providing in substance that the premises may be used only 
for a `Rickel' or `Channel' store[,] . .. . only for a `Home 
Center' store or for the sale of goods typically sold therein[, 
or terms] . . . . conditioning assignment on landlord 
consent . . . ."3 
 
LRSC objected, arguing, inter alia, that these lease 
provisions were integral to the bargain it had struck with 
Rickel and also that by seeking to excise or waive these 
terms Rickel was attempting to renege on the parties' prior 
stipulation allowing Rickel to assume the Lease and extend 
it for another term. On February 26, 1998, the District 
Court withdrew the reference to the Bankruptcy Court and 
held hearings relating to the proposed transaction on 
February 26, March 3, and March 4, 1998. 
 
On March 6, 1998, the court granted Rickel's motion. 
The court determined that due to changes in the home 
improvement industry "the market for [home improvement 
centers] is either non-existent or in dire straits, [and that] 
such use restrictions would make it impossible . . . to 
assign the Lawrence Lease . . . ." In re Rickel Home Centers, 
Inc., 240 B.R. 826, 832 (D. Del. 1998). The court based this 
finding on the proffer of testimony by Joseph Nusim, 
president and chief executive officer of Rickel, that the four 
home center chains that formerly operated in New Jersey 
were out of business or no longer operating in that state, a 
pattern apparently typical in the home center industry. 
Supp. App. at 128-29. Nusim's proffered testimony would 
have described the negative impact of large-scale home 
improvement centers like Home Depot on smaller home 
improvement centers like Rickel. Supp. App. at 129-30. The 
court also noted that LRSC did not contest this proffer and 
that LRSC's intended use for the Lawrence center premises, 
which involved dividing the premises into a series of smaller 
stores catering to specific home improvement needs, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See Motion for an Order Authorizing Debtor to Assume (Where 
Applicable) & Sell & Assign Nonresidential Real Property Leases at 2 
(Docket # 1275) (hereafter "Motion to Sell & Assign"). 
 
3. Id. at 15. 
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actually supported Rickel's claim that there were no 
potential buyers who could comply with the use restriction. 
The District Court therefore held that the Article 10 use 
provision amounted to a de-facto prohibition on assignment 
and permanently excised the use provision from the Lease. 
 
The court also determined that the leases in the Staples 
transaction constituted 96 percent of Rickel's assets and 
that, as a result, Staples qualified as a "successor" under 
Article 15A of the Lease. This holding relieved Rickel of the 
need to notify LRSC of or obtain its consent to the 
assignment to Staples. The court did not excise the 
assignment provisions from the Lease and, in fact, held 
that "once the leases have been assigned to Staples . . . 
Staples will be subjected to all the provisions of the leases 
for purposes of their subletting efforts." In re Rickel, 240 
B.R. at 837. 
 
Purporting to act under sections 363, 365(a) and 365(f) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, the District Court granted Rickel's 
request to "sell 41 of its leases to Staples . . . and to 
assume (where applicable) and assign the selected leases 
that Staples desires to have assigned to it . . . ." Id. at 828. 
Furthermore, the court determined that Staples and its 
nominee would receive the protection of section 363(m) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, which protects good faith purchasers 
or lessees of property of the bankruptcy estate from the 
effects of a reversal or modification on appeal of the 
authorization to sell or lease the property, if the appellant 
fails to obtain a stay. The court specifically found that 
Staples was a good faith purchaser under this section, see 
District Court Order at 4 (Addendum to Appellant's Br. at 
19), a finding that LRSC does not contest. The court finally 
held that it would retain jurisdiction over certain 
subsequent disputes. The court did not specify the period 
for which it would retain jurisdiction, but the current term 
of the Lease expires on January 31, 2002.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although LRSC agreed to extend the Lease through January 31, 2002 
when it settled its dispute with Rickel, it contends in its brief that the 
Lease has "in excess of eight years to run . . . ." Appellant's Br. at 24. 
LRSC did not explain this discrepancy but we assume LRSC included 
five years from the remaining option to renew the Lease. 
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LRSC appealed but did not attempt to obtain a stay of 
the District Court's order. On appeal, it challenges several 
aspects of the District Court's order of March 6, 1998: it 
objects to the excision of the use provision, contends that 
the court erred by "altering the assignment provisions" of 
the Lease, Appellant's Br. at 18, challenges the court's 
decision to authorize a sale of the leases under section 363 
of the Bankruptcy Code and to permit Staples to invoke the 
protections of the section 363(m) stay provision, and 
challenges the court's decision to retain jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes between it and Staples. In addition, LRSC 
challenges the procedure by which the court resolved 
factual disputes, arguing that the District Court erred in 
allowing the assignment of the Lease without direct 
testimony but based only upon proffers of evidence. 5 
 
Of course, Staples and Rickel defend the District Court's 
decision. They argue, inter alia, that the court properly 
excised the use provision, that it did not alter or excise the 
Article 15 assignment provision,6 and that, regardless of the 
appropriateness of the procedure adopted by the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Under the procedure adopted by the District Court, Staples and Rickel 
were permitted to present evidence by proffer or by live witness 
testimony pertinent to the transfer of all 41 leases. Individual landlords 
were then permitted to respond "with an objection specific to their 
property," App. at 45, and could present evidence in support of that 
objection by proffer or by witness testimony, App. at 45-46. Each 
landlord, however, was limited to 15 minutes in which to present its 
objection. App. at 44, 46. It is not clear whether the 15 minute limit 
applied only to the objecting landlords or to the initial presentation by 
Staples and Rickel as well. Although the court apparently required each 
witness whose testimony was proffered to be present during the proffer, 
LRSC contends that it was denied the opportunity to cross-examine 
these potential witnesses. In lieu of cross-examination, the court 
permitted the attorneys for each side to ask questions of opposing 
counsel. App. at 58-61. 
 
6. The District Court specifically found that"the assignment and 
subletting provisions are not facially unreasonable. Therefore, once 
Staples assumes the Lawrence Lease, Staples will be required to abide 
by these provisions." In re Rickel, 240 B.R. at 837. In response to our 
questioning at oral argument, counsel for Staples conceded that Staples 
would be bound by these provisions with respect to any attempt to 
assign the Lease or sublet the remaining 14,000 square feet. 
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Court, Rickel failed to proffer any evidence that created a 
dispute with respect to any material issue of fact. 
Additionally, Appellees argue that this appeal is mooted by 
section 363(m) of the Code and that, in the alternative, the 
appeal is equitably moot because events occurring after the 
District Court's decision prevent our granting effective 
relief. In their joint brief, Staples and Rickel assert that the 
transaction between them closed on or about April 1, 1998, 
that Staples has been in possession of the Lawrence center 
premises for almost seven months [now approximately 
twenty-four months], that a Staples store opened for 
business on August 1, 1998, and that Staples has spent 
over $900,000 in leasehold improvements to the premises. 
They append to the joint brief a photograph of the Staples 
storefront. LRSC has contested our ability to take notice of 
these facts, but it did not contest their accuracy either in 




Because this is an appeal from a district court exercising 
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy, our jurisdiction stems 
from 28 U.S.C. S 1291 rather than 28 U.S.C.S 158(d). See 
In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 470 
(3d Cir. 1998). We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court's legal conclusions but will reverse findings of fact 









111 U.S.C. S 363 
 
Section 363 permits the trustee, after notice and a 
hearing, to use, sell, or lease property of the estate outside 
of the ordinary course of business. 11 U.S.C. S 363(b)(1). 
For our purposes, Rickel, as debtor-in-possession, had the 
authority to exercise the same powers as the trustee. 11 
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U.S.C. S 1107(a); 11 U.S.C. S 1108; see also In re C&S Grain 
Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995). 7 "Property of 
the estate" includes, inter alia, "all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case." 11 U.S.C. S 541(a)(1). As the legislative history 
makes clear, "[t]he scope of this paragraph is broad. It 
includes all kinds of property, including tangible or 
intangible property, causes of action . . . . [and] also 
includes `title' to property, which is an interest, just as are 
a possessory interest, or leasehold interest, for example." 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5785, 5868. Whether the 
debtor has an interest in property under section 541 is 
determined according to state law. See Krebs Chrysler- 
Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 497 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
Significantly, section 363(m) also provides that: 
 
       [t]he reversal or modification on appeal of an 
       authorization under subsection (b) . . . of a sale or 
       lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or 
       lease under such authorization to an entity that 
       purchased or leased such property in good faith, 
       whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the 
       appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or 
       lease were stayed pending appeal. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 363(m). 
 
We have referred to section 363(m) as a "statutory 
mootness" provision. See Krebs, 141 F.3d at 497. In 
construing section 363(m), we have rejected a per se rule 
"mooting appeals absent a stay of the sale or lease at 
issue," id. at 498, and instead require that two conditions 
be met before an appeal becomes moot under section 
363(m): (1) the underlying sale or lease must not have been 
stayed pending appeal, and (2) reversing or modifying the 
authorization to sell or lease would affect the validity of the 
sale or lease, see id. at 499; see also In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. For that reason, we will use the terms trustee and debtor-in- 
possession interchangeably throughout this opinion. 
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271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994) (although S 363(m) prevented court 
from annulling sale of land, appeal not moot where trustee 
had not disbursed sale proceeds and debtor asserted right 




111 U.S.C. S 365 
 
Section 365 enables the trustee to maximize the value of 
the debtor's estate by assuming executory contracts and 
unexpired leases that benefit the estate and rejecting those 
that do not. 11 U.S.C. S 365(a); see also Stewart Title Guar. 
Co. v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 83 F.3d 735, 741 
(5th Cir. 1996) (section 365 "allows a trustee to relieve the 
bankruptcy estate of burdensome agreements which have 
not been completely performed"); see generally 2 Norton 
Bankruptcy Law & Practice 2d S 39:1 (William L. Norton, 
Jr. ed., 1997) [hereafter "Norton"]. 
 
Because executory contracts and unexpired leases 
involve a continuing relationship between the debtor and 
other parties, section 365 "gives special treatment to rights 
and liabilities flowing from these contracts and leases." Id. 
S 39:1, at 39-6. If there has been a default in an executory 
contract or unexpired lease, the trustee may not assume it 
until the trustee: (1) cures or provides adequate assurance 
that it will promptly cure the default; (2) compensates or 
provides adequate assurance of prompt future 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss resulting from the 
default; and (3) provides adequate assurance of future 
performance under the contract or lease. 11 U.S.C. 
S 365(b)(1)(A), (B), (C). Once the trustee satisfies these 
requirements it may assume the contract or lease, but it 
must do so in its entirety. See Stewart Title Guar. Co., 83 
F.3d at 741. 
 
The Code, however, prevents enforcement of so-called 
ipso facto clauses that trigger a default upon a bankruptcy 
filing or upon "events or conditions that are likely to occur 
or exist around the time that a case is commenced." 3 
Collier on Bankruptcy P 365.05[4] (Lawrence P. King ed., 
15th ed. 1999). To that end, the requirements of section 
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365(b)(1) do not apply to defaults triggered by provisions 
relating to the insolvency or financial condition of the 
debtor, the commencement of a Chapter 11 case, or the 
appointment of a trustee in the case or a custodian before 
the case. 11 U.S.C. S 365(b)(2); see also  11 U.S.C. 
S 365(e)(1) (contract or lease may not be terminated or 
modified after commencement of case notwithstanding ipso 
facto clause, or applicable law, permitting such 
termination). 
 Shopping center landlords, even more than other non- 
debtor parties to executory contracts and unexpired leases, 
receive "extraordinary protection" under the Code. Collier, 
supra, P 365.02, at 365-17; see also In re Goldblatt Bros. 
Inc., 766 F.2d 1136, 1140 (7th Cir. 1985) (referring to 
"special protections available to shopping center 
landlords"). The right to assume a defaulted lease of real 
property in a shopping center, as with any executory 
contract or unexpired lease, is conditioned upon the 
trustee's provision of adequate assurance of future 
performance. 
 
Section 365(b)(3), however, imposes a heightened 
standard for "adequate assurance of future performance" in 
shopping center leases. That standard requires adequate 
assurance: 
 
       (A) of the source of rent and other consideration due 
       under such lease, and in the case of an 
       assignment, that the financial condition and 
       operating performance of the proposed assignee 
       . . . shall be similar to [that of] the debtor. . . .; 
 
       (B) that any percentage rent due . . . will not decline 
       substantially; 
 
       (C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is 
       subject to all the provisions thereof, including (but 
       not limited to) provisions such as a radius, 
       location, use, or exclusivity provision, and will not 
       breach any such provision contained in any other 
       [agreement] relating to such shopping center; and 
 
       (D) that assumption or assignment . . . will not 
       disrupt any tenant mix or balance . . . . 
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11 U.S.C. S 365(b)(3).8 
 
Having assumed an executory contract or unexpired 
lease, the trustee may elect to assign it. The Code generally 
favors free assignability as a means to maximize the value 
of the debtor's estate and, to that end, allows the trustee to 
assign notwithstanding a provision in the contract or lease, 
or applicable law, prohibiting, restricting, or conditioning 
assignment. 11 U.S.C. S 365(f)(1); see also In re 
Headquarters Dodge, Inc., 13 F.3d 674, 682 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(S 365(f)(1) prevents anti-alienation and other clauses from 
defeating trustee's "ability to realize the full value of the 
debtor's assets"). Likewise, the Code prohibits the 
termination or modification of executory contracts or 
unexpired leases notwithstanding lease or contract 
provisions or applicable law that permit termination or 
modification because of assignment of the lease. 11 U.S.C. 
S 365(f)(3). 
 
The trustee may assign an executory contract or 
unexpired lease only if (A) it assumes the contract or lease 
in accordance with section 365 and (B) there is adequate 
assurance of future performance by the assignee. 11 U.S.C. 
S 365(f)(2). This assurance is necessary to protect the rights 
of the non-debtor party to the contract or lease, because 
assignment relieves the trustee and the estate from liability 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The pre-1984 definition of adequate assurance of future performance 
with respect to leased property in shopping centers included, inter alia, 
assurance that the assumption or assignment would not "breach 
substantially" any radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision in any 
other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement and would not 
"disrupt substantially" any tenant mix or balance. 11 U.S.C. 
S 365(b)(3)(C), (D) (1982) (amended 1984). 
 
The 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, effective with respect 
to cases filed 90 days after July 10, 1984, imposed "a more restrictive 
view . . . in connection with radius, location, or use clauses in shopping 
center leases." Norton S 39:46, at 39-133. The amendments made 
assumption and assignment of shopping center leases expressly subject 
to all provisions of the lease being assigned, including use clauses, 11 
U.S.C. S 365(b)(3)(C), and also deleted the"substantiality" standard from 
S 365(b)(3)(C), which requires adherence to other agreements affecting 
shopping centers, and from S 365(b)(3)(D), which requires that 
assumption or assignment not disrupt any tenant mix or balance. 
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arising from a post-assignment breach. 11 U.S.C.S 365(k); 
Wainer v. A.J. Equities, Ltd., 984 F.2d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 
1993) (per curiam). Where the leased premises are in a 
shopping center, the assignee must meet the heightened 
definition of adequate assurance of future performance in 
section 365(b)(3) to ensure that "[t]he essential terms of a 
debtor's lease in a shopping center [are] not . . . changed in 





We consider at the outset the contention of the Appellees 
that this appeal is now moot because the completed 
transaction is protected from reversal or modification under 
section 363(m) unless it was stayed pending appeal. LRSC 
argues that it was not required to obtain a stay under 
section 363(m), and relies primarily on our decision in In re 
Joshua Slocum, Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081(3d Cir. 1991). Rickel 
and Staples, citing our later decision in Krebs , 141 F.3d 
490, respond that Slocum is inapplicable and, in the 
alternative, that even if section 363(m) were inapplicable, 
this appeal is nonetheless barred by the doctrine of 
equitable mootness. We address these issues first, as only 
if we find that this appeal is not moot will we reach the 




LRSC's argument that the appeal is not moot 
notwithstanding its failure to obtain a stay stems from its 
contention that section 363(m) is inapplicable, that the 
transaction between Rickel and Staples was the assignment 
of a lease, and that the District Court erred in 
characterizing the assignment as a sale. Unlike section 363, 
which applies to the use, sale or lease of property, section 
365, which applies to the assignment of a lease, does not 
contain a statutory mootness provision. LRSC thus states, 
"[s]ince Congress did not provide for the sale of executory 
contracts or unexpired leases [in section 365], . . . the 
transaction between the Debtor and Staples is, in fact, an 
assignment of a lease and not a sale [under section 363]." 
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Appellant's Br. at 22. Although LRSC does not elaborate 
much beyond this, its argument has some facial 
plausibility. However, ultimately it is not persuasive. 
 
This court's most recent consideration of this issue was 
in connection with an executory contract in Krebs Chrysler- 
Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 
1998). Unexpired leases, like executory contracts, are 
included in the definition of "property of the estate" under 
section 541. See id. at 497 (franchise agreement was 
executory contract and property of the estate); In re Arizona 
Appetito's Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(leasehold interest is property of the estate if debtor is 
lessee at time petition is filed). Section 363(b)(1) authorizes 
the sale of such property outside the ordinary course of the 
debtor's business. Arguably, then, executory contracts and 
unexpired leases may be sold pursuant to section 363 and 
the mootness provision of 363(m) would apply to such 
sales. 
 
However, section 365, which lacks a mootness provision, 
contains specific rules governing the procedure for 
assuming, rejecting, and assigning executory contracts and 
unexpired leases and provides explicit protections for non- 
debtor parties to those contracts, especially shopping center 
landlords. LRSC proposes that we hold that only section 
365 governs the transfer of executory contracts and 
unexpired leases. Cf. Comco Assocs. & SPA 77K L.P. v. 
Faraldi Food Indus. Ltd., 170 B.R. 765, 770 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(holding lease assignment moot but recognizing that"the 
Code has distinct provisions for sales and leases on the one 
hand and assignments on the other"). Indeed, LRSC argues 
that our decision in Slocum mandates a holding that 
section 363(m) does not apply to this case. That argument 
fails to take into account the effect of our subsequent 
decision in Krebs regarding the scope of section 363(m) and 
the effect of the failure to obtain a stay. 
 
In Slocum, the bankruptcy court had authorized the 
trustee for the debtor lessee to assume a lease for retail 
space, excise an average sales clause allowing either the 
lessee or the landlord to terminate the lease if the lessee's 
average yearly sales fell below a set amount, and assign the 
lease pursuant to section 365. The bankruptcy court 
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viewed the average sales clause as a disguised anti- 
assignment provision. The district court affirmed, and the 
landlord appealed. This court reversed, holding that the 
bankruptcy court had erred in ruling that the landlord's 
property was not a shopping center, and that, in light of the 
shopping center provisions of the Code, the bankruptcy 
court lacked the authority to excise the average sales 
clause from the lease.9 
 
Before reaching this issue, we had to consider the 
trustee's motion to dismiss the appeal. The trustee argued 
that the "principle of finality embodied inS 363(m) . . . 
should be applied to assignments under S 365." Slocum, 
922 F.2d at 1085. Significantly, the trustee invoked 
underlying principles of finality rather than the statute, as 
he conceded that section 363(m) "does not apply to 
assignments of leases under S 365." Id.  Both the majority 
and the dissent in Slocum declined to extend section 363(m) 
to cover the transaction at issue there.10  The majority noted 
that only sections 363(m) and 364(e) of the Code specifically 
require a stay pending appeal, and stated "[w]hile S 363(m) 
contains a provision requiring a stay, the section that 
applies in this case, S 365, does not." Id. The majority held 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The majority recognized that the 1984 amendments applied to the 
case before it. See Slocum, 922 F.2d at 1086 (discussing 1984 
amendments). The debtor had filed for Chapter 11 in November of 1988, 
see id. at 1083, and the 1984 amendments were effective with respect to 
cases filed 90 days after July 10, 1984, see supra note 8. In analyzing 
this issue, however, the Slocum majority quoted the pre-1984 version of 
section 365(b)(3) that was no longer in force. See id. at 1086 n.3. Its 
subsequent discussion appeared to follow therefrom. For example, the 
majority stated that "Congress did not envision literal compliance with 
all lease provisions; insubstantial disruptions in, inter alia, tenant 
mix, 
 
and insubstantial breaches in other leases or agreements were 
contemplated and allowed." Id. at 1090 (citing 11 U.S.C. S 365(b)(3)(C), 
(D)); see supra note 8 (discussing how Congress removed the 
"substantiality standard" from these sections in 1984). We do not 
suggest that this affected the result reached in that case. 
 
10. The dissent, the author of this opinion, relied on "well-established 
rules of justiciability" and "the particular need for finality in 
bankruptcy" 
to find "the appeal of a completed lease assignment to a non-party moot 
unless the appellant has sought a stay pending appeal." Slocum, 922 
F.2d at 1093 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
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that "under the facts of this case [the landlord] was under 
no obligation to obtain a stay." Id. 
 
The Slocum majority also rejected the argument that the 
appeal was equitably moot. The majority regarded the 
landlord's appeal as from the order excising the average 
sales clause, as to which effective relief was still possible, 
rather than from the assignment of the lease, which had 
already taken place in the absence of a stay. See id. at 
1086 & n.2. Of relevance to the issue before us, the 
majority stated, "[i]f we started our analysis with the 
assignment, and not with excisement of [the average sales 
clause], we would probably reach the same result[as the 
dissent]." Id. at 1086 n.2. 
 
We addressed the issue of mootness under section 
363(m) again in Krebs. The debtor, Valley Motors, Inc. 
("Valley"), an automobile dealer, had entered into a pre- 
petition buy-sell agreement for its interest in a Jeep-Eagle 
franchise with Krebs, another automobile dealer. Krebs had 
paid the first half of the purchase price due under the buy- 
sell agreement, Chrysler had approval of the transfer, and 
the parties awaited resolution of protests by competing 
dealers when Valley filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. After 
motions and orders not relevant here, Valley filed three 
motions: one to reject the buy-sell agreement with Krebs, 
the second to sell all its franchises and other assets to a 
third dealer, and the third to assume its three franchise 
agreements. The assumption was a prerequisite to the sale 
Valley sought in the second motion. The bankruptcy court 
granted Valley's motion to reject the buy-sell agreement, 
overruled the objection of Krebs and Chrysler to the three 
motions, permitted the third dealer to withdraw its offer to 
purchase Valley's assets, and held an auction of the three 
franchises. Krebs purchased the franchises but refused to 
close on the sale. The bankruptcy court ordered it to do so, 
and Krebs appealed. 
 
In the portion of our opinion of relevance here, we held 
that Krebs's appeal was moot under section 363(m). We 
focused on the undisputed status of the underlying 
franchises as executory contracts. Id. at 496. We disagreed 
with Krebs's contention "that the franchises were assumed 
and assigned under section 365, which exclusively governs 
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the rejection, assumption, and assignment of executory 
contracts." Id. at 497. We framed the issue as: "whether 
section 365 [which does not have a statutory mootness 
provision] is the exclusive provision governing the sale of 
the franchises or whether the mootness provision in section 
363 also covers this situation. In other words, . . . whether 
assignments of the franchises under section 365 are also 
sales of estate property subject to section 363(m)." Id. at 
497. 
 
After noting that section 363(b) permits the trustee to 
"use, sell, or lease . . . property of the estate," id.; 11 U.S.C. 
S 363(b), which includes "all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case," 
id.; 11 U.S.C. S 541(a)(1), we determined that under 
Pennsylvania law the franchise agreements "are interests in 
property, and as such are property of the estate under 
section 541." Krebs, 141 F.3d at 498. We continued, 
"[t]herefore, section 363(m) governs the sale of the 
franchises here, notwithstanding that section 365 applies to 
the particular mechanics of conveyance."11 Id. However, we 
eschewed any per se rule that the failure to obtain a stay 
of a sale authorized under section 363(b) automatically 
mooted an appeal and held instead that section 363(m) 
would moot an appeal only when reversal or modification of 
the authorization would affect the validity of the sale or 
lease. See id. at 499. 
 
Krebs distinguished Slocum on the ground that the 
trustee in Slocum never attempted to sell the lease under 
section 363, the bankruptcy court never purported to 
authorize a section 363 sale, and the parties "conceded that 
section 363(m) did not apply in cases where the Trustee 
merely assigns a lease under section 365." Id. at 498. Here, 
we are faced with the precise facts that Krebs  noted were 
significant by their absence in Slocum. Rickel specifically 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Although the Krebs court did not explain the latter phrase, it appears 
that it viewed section 365 as establishing the requirements for 
assumption and assignment of executory contracts and unexpired 
leases, such as the provision of adequate assurance of future 
performance, and that it sought to ensure those requirements could not 
be circumvented by the parties' characterization of the transaction as a 
sale rather than an assignment. 
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requested authorization to sell the 41 Staples leases, see 
Motion to Sell & Assign at 8, and the District Court 
explicitly authorized a sale of the leases pursuant to section 
363, despite LRSC's contention that section 363 was 
inapplicable to this transaction. Although LRSC argues that 
the District Court erred in characterizing the transaction as 
a "sale" under section 363(m), it does not argue that sales 
are not subject to the protection from reversal absent a 
stay. 
 
A determination of section 363(m) mootness in the case 
before us necessarily follows from our holding and analysis 
in Krebs. Rickel's unexpired lease is treated in the 
Bankruptcy Code the same as the executory contracts in 
Krebs. Both executory contracts and unexpired leases, for 
example, are included in the definition of "property of the 
estate" contained in section 541.12  Furthermore, executory 
contracts and unexpired leases are equally subject to the 
requirements for assumption, rejection, and assignment 
established by section 365. 
 
We are aware that "[t]he application of CodeS 363 . . . to 
executory contracts is not without controversy." Lee R. 
Bogdanoff, The Purchase and Sale of Assets in 
Reorganization Cases -- of Interest and Principal, of 
Principles and Interests, 47 Bus. Law. 1367, 1425 n.215 
(1992) (referencing the split in authority regarding whether 
a lessor is entitled to adequate protection under section 
363(e)). But, given our holding in Krebs that "section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. As discussed supra, section 541 defines "property of the estate" to 
include, inter alia, "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property [defined by state law] as of the commencement of the case." The 
parties do not dispute that a leasehold interest is a property interest 
under New Jersey law. Furthermore, section 541 excludes from its 
definition of "property of the estate" those interests of the debtor as 
lessee of nonresidential real property that have"terminated at the 
expiration of the stated term of such lease before the commencement of 
the case" and those interests that have "terminated . . . during the 
case." 
 
11 U.S.C. S 541(b)(2). These exclusions imply that leasehold interests of 
nonresidential real property, like the interest at issue here, are 
property 
 
of the estate when they do not terminate before or during the 
bankruptcy case. LRSC does not argue that the Lawrence Center Lease 
falls within either of these exclusions. 
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363(m) governs the sale of the franchises," whereas "section 
365 applies to the particular mechanics of conveyance," 
Krebs, 141 F.3d at 498, we would be creating an 
unwarranted distinction between executory contracts and 
unexpired leases (whether or not the lease is in a shopping 
center) if we were to accept LRSC's argument. 
 
The result reached by Krebs, and that we reach here, is 
supported by decisions from other courts of appeals that 
treated assignments of leasehold interests as sales of 
property under section 363 and applied section 363(m) to 
such assignments. For example, in In re Adamson Co. Inc., 
159 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 1998), the debtor asked the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to dismiss for mootness the 
landlord's appeal of an order authorizing a sale of most of 
the debtor's assets, including the lease to its manufacturing 
plant. The landlord argued that it was not required to 
obtain a stay because section 365 rather than section 363 
governed the assignment of the debtor's unexpired lease. 
The court rejected this argument, stating that "[i]t is 
elementary that a leasehold is personal property and 
possibly of value to the debtor's estate, thus the assignment 
of a lease . . . is a sale of property to whichS 363(m) 
applies." Id. at 898 (emphasis added). 
 
Likewise, in In re Exennium, Inc., 715 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 
1983), the court reversed the order of the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel voiding the sale of real estate leases and 
personal property. The Court of Appeals held that an 
appeal from an order "permitting the assumption and 
assignment of leases" was moot under section 363(m). Id. at 
1404.13 Although, unlike this case, the assignments of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The district court in Comco, 170 B.R. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), also 
dismissed as moot the landlord's appeal of the assignment of the 
debtor's shopping center lease and its remaining assets but differed in 
its approach. The court declined to extend section 363(m) to assignments 
when the assignment is inextricably linked to a section 363 sale, which 
it believed was the view adopted in In Re Stadium Management, 895 F.2d 
845 (1st Cir. 1990). The Comco court stated,"[b]esides stretching the 
plain language of S 363, this approach does not account for those 
situations where there is an assignment without a sale." Comco, 170 
B.R. at 770. The court also believed that the Exennium court failed to 
                                 20 
 
 
leases in both Adamson and Exennium were in conjunction 
with the sale of all or almost all of the debtors' remaining 
assets, Rickel had already disposed of all or almost all of its 
remaining assets at the time of the transaction with 
Staples. The District Court emphasized that the transfer of 
the unexpired leases to Staples involved 96 percent of 
Rickel's remaining assets. LRSC proffered no evidence 
countering Rickel's proffer supporting this finding, and even 
now has not suggested that there is contrary evidence that 
it could provide. 
 
These cases reflect the policies of section 363(m)"not 
only [to afford] finality to the judgment of the bankruptcy 
court, but particularly to give finality to those orders and 
judgments upon which third parties rely." In re Abbots 
Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(internal quotations omitted). The strength of these policies 
is reflected in numerous other decisions of the courts of 
appeals rejecting as moot an appeal from an order 
authorizing a sale of estate property under section 363 
when the transaction has been completed. See, e.g., In re 
Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1986) (sale of yacht 
moot despite argument that yacht was not property of the 
estate because "[s]ection 363(m) does not say that the sale 
must be proper under S 363(b)"); In re Stadium 
Management, Inc., 895 F.2d 845, 849 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(assignment of sublease as part of sale of stadium moot, 
citing Sax with approval); see also Pittsburgh Food & 
Beverage, Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645, 650-51 (3d Cir. 
1997) (holding that, at least where assets were"colorably 
within [the court's] jurisdiction," an appeal from a sale of 
assets was moot despite argument that court lacked 
jurisdiction over the assets); In re Gilchrist , 891 F.2d 559, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
recognize that although an assignment is a "species of sale, . . . the 
Code 
 
has distinct provisions for sales . . . and assignments." Id. at 770. 
Instead, the Comco court, expressing concern that the assignees would 
not receive exactly what the bankruptcy court ordered if the assignment 
were invalidated or the terms of the assignment changed, dismissed the 
appeal as moot because "[t]his Court cannot now change the terms of 
that transaction without throwing into question the validity of the entire 
transaction." Id. 
 
                                21 
 
 
561 (5th Cir. 1990) (appeal moot despite argument that 
bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to authorize sale). 
 
The policies undergirding section 363(m) are also 
reflected in our cases recognizing "the broader 
 
interpretation of mootness applied in bankruptcy cases, 
often referred to as `equitable mootness.' " In re Continental 
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(citations omitted). This doctrine holds that "[a]n appeal 
should . . . be dismissed as moot when, even though 
effective relief could conceivably be fashioned, 
implementation of that relief would be inequitable." Id. at 
559 (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d 
Cir. 1993)); see also In re Cantwell, 639 F.2d 1050, 1054 
(3d Cir. 1981) (appeal from order dissolving stay of debtor's 
discharge moot where subsequent order granting discharge 
had not been appealed); Markstein v. Massey Assocs., Ltd., 
763 F.2d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1985) (court was powerless 
to rescind foreclosure sale on debtor's property where 
debtor failed to obtain stay of order permitting foreclosure).14 
These mootness principles further the need for finality of 
bankruptcy transactions involving third parties and 
recognize that "in addition to those situations covered 
under 11 U.S.C. S 363(m) and S 364(e), a myriad of 
circumstances can occur that would necessitate the grant 
of a stay pending appeal in order to preserve a party's 
position." In re Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107, 
888 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 1989) (appeal from grant of 
relief from automatic stay moot where state supreme court 
order relieved debtor from liability to appellants). 
 
Concededly, the shopping center provisions of section 
365(b)(3) of the Code applied to the assignment of the 
Lease, and the provisions of the Lease (with the exception 
of the excision of the use restriction in Article 10) continue 
to apply. For example, at oral argument, Staples conceded 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Although we reference the principles underlying equitable mootness, 
we do not base our holding on that doctrine which has been used most 
frequently in cases where the reorganization has been substantially 
consummated. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 
1996). In light of our precedent in Krebs applying section 363(m), we 
need not consider whether equitable mootness could also be relied on as 
the basis for our holding. 
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that it could not assign or sublet to an entity that would 
violate another tenant's exclusive use or disrupt the tenant 
mix in the Lawrence center. 
 
Given the policies underlying section 363(m) and the 
series of cases that emphasize the importance of securing 
a stay, we are perplexed by LRSC's failure even to request 
a stay. Although there was a suggestion from LRSC at oral 
argument that the bond required for a stay would have 
been costly, it acknowledged it made no attempt to seek 
permission for a lower bond. Moreover, it failed to seek a 
stay limited to the Lawrence center lease, which might have 
substantially reduced the cost of a bond. In short, LRSC 
did nothing other than appeal and failed to take steps that 
might have minimized the dislocation a reversal of the 




As we noted in Krebs, "section 363(m) would not moot 
every appeal not accompanied by a stay." Krebs, 141 F.3d 
at 499. That section only "restrict[s] the results of a reversal 
or modification of a bankruptcy court's order authorizing a 
sale or lease, if reversal or modification would affect the 
validity of the sale or lease." Id. Krebs relied for its analysis 
on our earlier opinion in In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 
16 F.3d 552, 559-63 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), where we 
examined language in section 364(e) of the Code similar to 
section 363(m) about the effect of the appellant's failure to 
secure a stay pending an appeal of an authorization to 
obtain credit or incur debt or of a grant of priority or a 
loan. We reasoned in Swedeland that because section 
364(e) limits the consequences of the reversal or 
modification of an order entered under section 364, it is not 
section 364(e) itself that requires that the appeal be 
dismissed. Id. at 559. Instead, the appeal would be moot if 
the relief sought would adversely affect "the validity of the 
debt incurred . . ." Id. at 560. 
 
Applying that reasoning here, we note that once the 
District Court granted Rickel authorization to assume the 
Lease and assign it to Staples, the parties completed the 
transaction. Staples, relying on that authorization, took 
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possession and expended substantial funds to renovate and 
redesign the property to fit its business. Any revocation of 
the authorization would necessarily adversely affect the 
validity of the assignment. The same is true as to LRSC's 
challenge to the District Court's use of evidentiary proffers, 
as those proffers underlay the court's order on appeal. 
 
We must consider whether the same is true of the portion 
of the District Court's order that excised Article 10 from the 
Lease. That decision was based on the District Court's 
conclusion that compliance with the use limitation to 
establish only a home improvement center was not feasible 
as such a market was non-existent. Patently, reversal of the 
excision of the use provision as to Staples would adversely 
affect the validity of the transfer to it, as it has now been 
established as an office supply center, not a home 
improvement center. 
 
It is not clear that LRSC argues that the court erred by 
striking the use clause with respect to subsequent 
assignments or subleases by Staples, rather than arguing 
that no assignment at all should have been permitted 
without the use provision. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 9 
("LRSC objects to the . . . assignment made with the 
requested deletions . . . ."). In any event, the record 
demonstrates that a reversal of the District Court's decision 
to permanently strike the use restriction from the Lease 
would affect the validity of the assignment to Staples. 
Unlike Slocum, where we reversed the bankruptcy court's 
order excising an average sales clause from a lease after 
finding that the record did not support the trustee's claim 
that a reversal would overturn the assignment, and 
effectively rescind the lease, see Slocum, 922 F.2d at 1086 
n.2,15 Staples argued here that the District Court should 
excise the use provision "not just for the purpose of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. This discussion occurred in the Slocum  majority's analysis of 
equitable mootness, in which the majority responded to the dissent's 
argument that its decision would overturn a consummated transaction. 
922 F.2d at 1086 n.2. The majority disagreed that its holding would have 
so drastic an effect. By contrast, our inquiry under section 363(m) asks 
not whether reversal or modification on appeal would rescind the sale 
but whether such a decision would "affect the validity of the sale." 
Krebs, 
 
141 F.3d at 499; Pittsburgh Food & Beverage, 112 F.3d at 651. 
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assignment to Staples, but permanently, because it 
destroys the value of the leasehold to say it can only be 
used for a typical Channel Home Improvement Center when 
. . . [such a store] doesn't exist anymore." Supp. App. at 
134. The District Court accepted this argument based on 
proffered testimony by Rickel's CEO that home 
improvement centers similar to Rickel had been driven out 
of business or were struggling and that Rickel's efforts to 
market its leases had generated no interest whatever from 
such an entity. Supp. App. at 130. The court further noted 
that LRSC had proffered no evidence to rebut Staples's 
claim. See In re Rickel, 240 B.R. at 831. We thus need not 
decide whether the court erred in striking the use 
provision, because this record is sufficient for us to 
conclude that applying that provision to future assignments 
by Staples would seriously affect the validity of the 
transaction. Cf. In re Stadium Management, 895 F.2d at 
849 (absent a stay, appeal is moot even though appellate 
court would decide issues differently). 
 
Common sense also leads us to conclude that reversal of 
the District Court's decision to excise the use provision 
would affect the validity of the transaction between Rickel 
and Staples. As a result of that transaction, Staples 
received a lease that it could assign or sublease in 
accordance with various other lease provisions. 16 Were 
Staples limited to assigning or subleasing to a Channel 
Home Center or to an entity "similar in nature" to a 
Channel Home Center, the value of the Lease would be 
seriously affected and this would "impact the validity of the 
sale." Krebs, 141 F.3d at 499. We have held appeals moot 
under section 363(m) where appellant sought lesser forms 
of relief, using similar analysis. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Food & 
Beverage, 112 F.3d at 649-50 (relief that would 
demonstrate sale was flawed, including finding that trustee 
and purchaser knew bankruptcy court lacked authority to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Indeed, Article 15B.4. of the Lease, which the District Court did not 
excise, requires any assignment or sublease to any non-"Successor" or 
non-"Affiliate," as defined in the Lease, to prohibit the use of the 
premises "for any use which is on the date of execution of this Lease or 
at the time of such assignment or sublease the principal use of any 
tenant located in Shopping Center." Addendum to Appellant's Br. at 4. 
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sell assets and finding that sale price was inadequate, 
would affect the validity of the sale). 
 
As discussed above, supra note 8, we must recognize the 
Bankruptcy Code's requirement that the assumption and 
assignment of a shopping center lease be subject to all 
provisions of the lease being assigned, including use 
clauses. See 11 U.S.C. S 365(b)(3)(C). Nevertheless, because 
reversal of the District Court's decision to excise the use 
provision would affect the validity of the transaction 
between Rickel and Staples, LRSC's appeal on this point, 




There remains only to consider the provision of the 
District Court's order whereby it retained jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes involving the Lease, which LRSC requests 
us to reverse. We cannot conclude that this issue is moot 
because reversal or modification of that order would not 
affect the validity of the assignment to Staples. 
Nonetheless, we believe this issue is not ripe for review. 
 
In its order, the court purported to retain jurisdiction to 
"construe and determine any disputes under this Order or 
under the Agreement [between Rickel and Staples]." 
Addendum to Appellant's Br. at 29. In its opinion, the court 
explained that "should any landlord attempt to enforce a 
lease provision in an unreasonable manner, Staples is free 
to return to this Court for the appropriate relief. Likewise, 
if Staples attempts to unreasonably disregard any 
reasonable provision in its efforts to sublet the property, 
such that the landlord believes Staples is violatingS 365 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, the landlord may also return to this 
Court for the appropriate relief." In re Rickel, 240 B.R. at 
837. These statements suggest that the court envisioned a 
wide variety of future disputes between Staples and LRSC 
as falling within its retained jurisdiction. 
 
LRSC interprets the court to have retained jurisdiction 
over lease disputes between it and Staples that would have 
no impact on the bankruptcy estate and invokes the rule 
that "[s]uits between purchasers of property from the estate 
and third parties are . . . not encompassed within the 
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bankruptcy jurisdiction of the district courts." Collier, 
supra, P 3.01[4][c], at 3-30 n.91; see also In re Hall's Motor 
Transit Co., 889 F.2d 520, 522 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The 
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction does not follow the property, 
but rather, it lapses when the property leaves the debtor's 
estate."). Staples and Rickel, by contrast, argue that the 
court merely retained jurisdiction to interpret and enforce 
its own order. 
 
As neither party is now seeking to invoke the court's 
jurisdiction with respect to a particular dispute, a ruling on 
the court's jurisdiction in the future would "constitute 
nothing more than an advisory opinion based on a 
hypothetical scenario." 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's 
Federal Practice S 101.75, at 101-152 (Matthew Bender 3d 
ed. 1999). The ripeness doctrine "prevent[s] the courts, 
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . ." 
Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); In re 
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 995 F.2d 1138, 1146 
(2d Cir. 1993). Whether an issue is ripe for review depends 
on the "fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983); 
Pic-A-State PA, Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1298 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 Absent an actual dispute, any opinion we might render 
on the appropriateness of district court jurisdiction would 
be "an exercise in futility." Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. 
Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1990). Indeed, no 
dispute may arise, and we are confident that none of the 
parties will create one to test the issue. Accordingly, this 
issue is not fit for review at this time and the parties have 
not shown that they will be subject to hardship if this court 
withholds consideration at this time. In any event, if a 
dispute arises, it is the District Court that should 
determine in the first instance the propriety of its exercise 




For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss LRSC's appeal 
of the District Court's order authorizing the Staples 
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transaction and excising the use provision as moot 
pursuant to section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code 
because reversal or modification of that order would affect 
the validity of the assignment. The only portion of LRSC's 
appeal that is not moot is its appeal of the District Court's 
order retaining jurisdiction over future disputes. That issue, 
however, is not ripe for review. We will therefore dismiss 
that portion of LRSC's appeal as well. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                28 
 
